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In 1982-83, during the formulation of President Reagan's Carib-
bean Basin Initiative ("CBI"), the economies and political structures
of the Caribbean and Central America were under intense scrutiny.
As a result of the CBI, two regional international law instruments
presently exist--CBI and "Caricom," the Caribbean community-
that espouse the same goals: to improve living conditions in the
area, foster economic development, and obtain political and social
stability. Caricom, however, received very little attention and in the
resulting Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), plays
no role, either as a party or as an element in the state of affairs the
Act presumes. Possible consequences of the omission of the most
important regional association in the Caribbean and the interplay of
these two instruments, if both are to subsist, are of considerable in-
terest and constitute the focus of this article.
The CBI may be characterized as an economic reconstruction
and enhancement plan directed to overcome the limitations of many
small, poor island-nations and Central American nations by means of
interregional integration and harmonization of international trade
policies. The plan is articulated in the form of a series of agreements
between the United States and some individual countries of the re-
gion. This approach may hamper the plan's success. This article
first examines the structure, goals, and history of Caricom to evalu-
ate this international agreement in terms of the premises that under-
lie it and its success. Then the article examines some aspects of the
CBI as an international legal instrument and discusses its goals and
means. The interplay of these overlapping organs as seen in recent
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developments in the area's trade is the subject of the last part of this
article.
H. Caricom
A. History and Organization
Regional multi-nation agreements, one of the major strategies
used by underdeveloped countries to improve their socio-economic
conditions, have met varied results. In the English-speaking Carib-
bean, after several short-lived attempts at regional organization,'
Caricom was formed in 1973 and after a halting start has survived
and has been expanding in the mid-1980s. 2
Caricom's goals addressed the long-standing problems of the
region: several small-sized countries, many of which have only re-
cently achieved political independence, seek to improve their eco-
nomic performance and standards of living through economic
integration by the creation of a Common Market (in effect creating
organs to coordinate their foreign policies and trade strategies) and
by promoting functional cooperation among the member states.3
Caricom goals are designed to be met "by accelerated, coordinated
and sustained economic development, particularly through the exer-
cise of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources .... and
by presenting a common front to the external world."4
Caricom's predecessor was far less adventurous. Carifta, or the
Caribbean Free Trade Association, was basically a trade agreement
and had some limited success. Caricom responded to the need for a
supranational entity that would coordinate and rationalize the re-
gion's trade and economic planning.5 Perhaps the major exigence of
such a union is for member nations to forego pressing local needs in
order to fulfill the long-term goals of the region. Early in Caricom's
existence, commentators pointed out the possibility of fragmenta-
tion, stating that "it will be many years before nationalism would
have eroded to the point where there would be enough internal con-
sensus and purpose to permit more than what Caricom proposes to
I The West Indian Federation lasted from 1958 to 1962, and the Eastern Caribbean
Federation, from 1962 to 1965. The Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta) began in
1965 as a trade agreement between Antigua, Barbados, and Guyana, and was expanded in
1968 to include all the countries that would form Caricom in 1973: Trinidad and Tobago,
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Jamaica,
Montserrat, and Belize. H. GEISER, P. ALLEYNE & C. GAJRAJ, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CARIB-
BEAN INTEGRATION: A STUDY ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARICOM 9 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as LEGAL PROBLEMS].
2 See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
3 See Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S. 17
[hereinafter cited as Caricom Treaty]; see also LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 34-35.
4 LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 35.
5 Mann, Una evaluacidn de la Comunidad del Caribe: perspectivas y problemas en 1983, 92





Another identified obstacle to regional integration was the high
level of dependence on former colonial powers or on the neighbor-
ing developed countries. In a World Bank report on the Caribbean
integration movement, S.E. Chernick stated:
mhe integration movement among the Commonwealth Caribbean
states can be viewed as an attempt to overcome the handicaps of
small size, economic fragmentation, and extensive dependence on
extraregional markets and suppliers of resources of all kinds. The
principal idea behind integration is that pooling of local resources
and markets will yield a higher level of economic and social benefits
than could be attained by 'going it alone.' On the expectation that
mechanisms can be designed which will lead to this end, or will at
least give them a stronger bargaining position in relation to the
outside world, most of the Commonwealth Caribbean states con-
sider the integration option worthwhile. Since each of the alterna-
tives available to them involves some degree of dependence, it is
understandable that they would want to choose that course which
provides the best combination of economic viability and political au-
tonomy. The integration movement represents the closest approxi-
mation to that ideal. 7
Thus, to enhance both economic viability and political autonomy,
the regional integration "gamble" exchanged a measure of auton-
omy, by agreeing to support and follow a supra-national entity, for
increased economic welfare resulting from pooled resources and a
better bargaining position.
The internal structure created by the Caricom treaty is com-
prised of two organs: the Community and the Common Market.
The first is articulated in the body of the 1973 Treaty, the latter in
the Annex to the Treaty.8 The Community and Common Market in-
volve several policy-creating organisms, and quasi-executive agen-
cies 9 that purport to harmonize the legal and trade mechanisms, the
trade policies, and the fiscal incentives programs of the region.10 In-
6 O'Connell, The Caribbean Community: Economic Integration in tMe Commonwealth Carib-
bean, II J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 35, 45 (1976).
7 S.E. CHERNicK, THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: THE INTEGRATION ExPERIENCE 5
(1978).
8 Brief comments will suffice to describe the structure of Caricom and the Common
Market because the legal aspects of both organisms have been thoroughly discussed by
several authors. By far the best analysis of the structure and character of both agreements
appears in LEGAL P OBLEMs, supra note 1. Other useful references are S.E. CHERNICK,
supra note 7; W.A. AXLINE, CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: THE POLITICS OF REGIONALIsM
(1979); W. DEMAS, EssAvs ON CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1976).
9 The principal organs are a Conference of Heads of Government for the Commu-
nity, and a Council for the Common Market. Caricom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 6. Other
organisms cover areas such as health, education, labor, and foreign affairs, basically as
consultants, although each country is represented. See id. art. 10; Annex to the Caricom
Treaty, art. 5. 946 U.N.T.S. at 28 [hereinafter cited as Annex].
10 See Caricom Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 6, 10; Annex, supra note 9, arts. 3. 30, 40, 42.
On harmonization, see Liverpool, La ley como instrumento armonizador en eiproceso de integracidn
en el Caribe, 92 INTEGRACI6N LATINOAMERICANA 38, 39-40 (1984).
1986]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
deed, the two most important areas of activity are harmonization of
local legislation in accord with the regional goals, a duty placed on
the signatories by the treaty itself,"I and creation and maintenance of
favorable trade provisions among the members. 12
Caricom is the result of a multilateral treaty. Signatory states
are bound by the treaty to the extent that general international law
and the law of treaties impose duties upon member states.13 It has
been observed that "these instruments, once they are adopted, bring
into existence a new entity which has its own dynamics and develops
its own practices and rules."' 4 However, the extent of the Commu-
nity's power to enter into binding international agreements is un-
clear from the text. Article 8 of the Community instrument states:
4. Subject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Conference
[heads of government of member states] shall be the final authority
for the conclusion of treaties on behalf of the Community and for
entering into relationships between the Community and Interna-
tional Organizations and States.
The Community, through articles 20.1 and 20.3, has "full juridi-
cal personality" and "may enter into agreements with Member
States, non-Member States and International Organizations."'15
Thus far, however, the Community's power as a separate interna-
tional entity has not been tested. The text is ambiguous on the
power relationship between the Community and member states. In
the view of one observer:
It is true that according to the Community Instrument as well as the
Common Market Annex, the new Community has been invested
with important powers in the field of external relations. Both the
Community stricto sensu and the Common Market possess the capac-
ity to conclude treaties with non-Member States and other Interna-
tional Organizations in order to promote the objectives of the
Community and Common Market. However, nothing in these provi-
sions indicates that the treaty-making power of CARICOM has an
exclusive character, exclusive in the sense that the Community
alone, or the Common Market alone, can exercise it.16
Member states reserve the power to enter into agreements as long as
I Caricom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5 provides:
General Undertaking as to Implementation: Member states shall take all ap-
propriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the carrying out
of obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by
Organs of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the
objectives of the Community. They shall abstain from any measures which
could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.
12 See Annex, supra note 9, arts. 39-40.
13 See LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 81; Caricom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 20.1;
Annex, supra note 9, art. 63.1.
14 LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 81.
15 The analogous provisions for the Common Market appear in Annex, supra note 9,
art. 63.1. Agreements negotiated on behalf of the Common Market, however, must be
ratified by the Community's Conference. Id art. 70.2.
16 LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 74.
[VOL. I11
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
those agreements are not incompatible with the obligations of mem-
ber states.' 7
The arrangement distinguishes between more developed and
less developed countries.' 8 The meaning of "developed" in this
context is different from that which distinguishes between the "de-
veloped world" and the "underdeveloped world." Compared to the
industrialized world, even the "developed" countries of Caricom are
underdeveloped. Some, however, have natural resources or compar-
atively higher levels of industrialization than their sister nations.
The importance of this distinction lies in the recognition that even
among countries with so many commonalities, disparity among them
can be, and has been, a major disintegrating influence.'9 Below are
some comments on the major problems and characteristic traits of
the region and of the development strategy Caricom reflects.
1. Infrastructure needs
One of the major disparities among the Caricom nations is the
level of infrastructure needs. Airports, roads, electricity, and the
other utilities are far below the standards required for most indus-
tries--especially in the smaller nations. Investment by international
development agencies has focused on improving the attractiveness
of all member countries, but basic services, as well as skilled workers
and administrative and technical personnel remain insufficient or ab-
sent.20 As will be seen later, one of the major criticisms of the CBI is
that it ignores this disparity in establishing a regional policy--thus
encouraging the disparities to become more acute as the more devel-
oped countries grow to their infrastructure's capacity.2 1
17 Annex, supra note 9, art. 68. No similar provision appears in the Treaty, which is
not surprising, for member states would never accept such a great limitation on their
treaty-making power.
18 See Caricom Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 1, 2. The more developed countries are
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago; less developed countries are Anti-
gua, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia,
and St. Vincent. In Barbados, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1982 at current prices
was B$1,995 million (US$1 = B$2.01, Sept. 1984); in Guyana, the Gross National Product
(GNP) in 1982 at current prices was G$1,296 million (US$1 = G$3.75, Sept. 1984); in
Jamaica, the GNP in 1982 at current prices was J$5,392.2 million (US$1 = J$3.87, Sept.
1984); in Trinidad and Tobago, the GDP in 1982 at current prices was T1$ 17,831.8 mil-
lion (US$1 = TT$2.40, Sept. 1984). All of the following figures refer to GDP at market
prices, in EC dollars (US$1 = EC$2.70, Sept. 1984); Antigua, $91 million; St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, $50 million; Montserrat, $20.2 million; Grenada, $107.6 million; St. Lucia,
$119.2 million; St. Vincent, $78 million; Dominica, $66 million. See 1984 Q ECON. Rzv.
W. INDiEs. BEiMZE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GUYANA 12, 21, 29, 36, 49 (Ann. Supp.).
19 See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
20 Many suggest that the key difference between the members should not be called
"development," but "capacity." So long as the productive capacity disparity remains un-
resolved, remedial measures will not be successful. See Mann, Una evaluacidn, supra note 5,
at 36.
21 Mann, La Iniciativa de la Cuenca del Caribe: perspectivas y probirmas de la inegracidn
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2. Scales
Given the small size of the individual countries and the small
level of productive capacity, both as markets and as productive units,
the Caribbean nations must overcome the economics of scale.
"Modem technology requires productive and administrative units
which are simply too large for the domestic markets of most of the
Caribbean Commonwealth states. Since the capacity to adapt this
technology is limited, the choice has usually been confined to the
costly extremes of either doing without or creating excess capac-
ity."' 22 This two-pronged problem is a major disincentive for foreign
capital to invest in the region.23 The regional approach is by defini-
tion an attempt to overcome the liabilities of scale by joining efforts
as a larger whole.
3. Intra-regional disparities
As mentioned above, the disparities in the Caribbean region
present a formidable obstacle to development and growth and to the
effort to harmonize development in the various nations. Existing
disparities in population, size, and financial and mineral resources
are exacerbated by the fact that the area is divided by water and by
insufficient means of communication. 24 Dealing with the conflicts
these disparities create has been one of Caricom's major difficulties.
Closely related to this problem lies the notion that free trade, unfet-
tered, will polarize existing and potential disparities, although free
trade is understood to be the only way the region's poor economies
will receive infusions of needed capital.25
caribe&ia (CARICOM), 82 INTEGRAcI6N LATINOAMERICANA 30, 36-37 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Mann, La lniciativa].
22 S.E. CHERNICK, supra note 7, at 4.
23 See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: Hearings on S. 544 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 159-60 (1983) (statement of Prof. Joseph Pelzman, George
Washington University) [hereinafter cited as Hearins].
Despite all these attractive incentives [referring to investment incentives
and tax holidays], the Caribbean countries suffer from all the major difficul-
ties and constraints associated with small size. These include the undiversi-
fled nature of their economies, the high import content of all goods and
services and the lack of capital formation to undertake major public invest-
ment programs. They also lack adequate internal or regional markets to ab-
sorb domestic production. At the same time, the lack of adequate
infrastructure provides the proper disincentive for the formation of an active
export sector.
Id.
24 Mann, Una evaluacidn, supra note 5, at 23. Belize and Guyana own more than 90%
of the land, but have less than 20% of the population; Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Jamaica have approximately 98% of the Community's mineral resources. Production in
the more industrialized countries-Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados, and
Guyana-represents 91% of the area's GNP and 94% of the Community's manufacturing
production. Id
25 W.A. AxLINE, supra note 8, at 23.
[F]ree trade, with or without a regional protective policy should not be the
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This regional approach places a high strain on the more devel-
oped countries which, in order to allow less developed countries to
grow, may have to sacrifice individual welfare for the sake of regional
well-being.2 6 Indeed, the Treaty in article 4 (ii) states as one of its
goals "the sustained expansion and continuing integration of eco-
nomic activities, the benefits of which shall be equitably shared tak-
ing into account the need to provide special opportunities for the
Less Developed Countries."
4. Policies: Controlled investment
Another of the main objectives of the Caricom treaty is "the
achievement of a greater measure of economic independence and ef-
fectiveness of its member states in dealing with states, groups of
states and entities of whatever description. ' 27 As former colonies,
both political and economic autonomy is highly valued by these
countries. Programs attracting investment have the dual goals of
hosting foreign capital and retaining the power to control national
affairs.
Industrialization, on the other hand, is needed almost uncondi-
tionally. Increasing the level of industrialization will serve the goals
of increasing employment opportunities, increasing local produc-
tion, and raising "foreign exchange earnings." 28 "[it has been
strongly believed in the region that industrialization of the right kind
plays an important and dynamic role in economic development. In-
dustrialization which creates sectoral linkages-national or re-
gional-will, it is believed, bring new resources into use and reduce
dependence on the outside world."'29 The "right kind" of industrial-
ization fosters the goals of development without extracting too great
a price.
Indeed, the "wrong kind" of industrialization has been de-
scribed as the "Puerto Rico model."5 0 Based on tariff-free treatment
and tax incentives-the original approach the CBI was designed to
principal goal or even a major goal of Third World integration schemes.
Although elimination of intra-regional barriers to trade may lead to signifi-
cant increases in trade in some cases this is not likely to contribute in a major
way to the development of the region.
it Axline's conclusion is that free trade must be coordinated with, and monitored by,
regional planning.
26 See O'Connell, supra note 6, at 46. Some developed countries have made sacrifices,
and the effects of unilateral actions by the developed countries to protect their own econo-
mies have been very consequential in the rest of the Caribbean. See infra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.
27 Caricom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(a)(iii).
28 S.E. CHERNICK, supra note 7, at 190.
29 jd
50 See Hearings, supra note 23, at 197 (statement of Robert A. Pastor, University of
Maryland); Pastor, Sinking in the Caribbean Basin, 60 FoRExGN Air. 1038, 1050-51 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Pastor, Sinking]; Weintraub, A Flawed Model, 47 FOREIGN POL'Y 128,
132 (1982).
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take-this model has been criticized because "those measures distort
the relative prices of labor and capital. Even during Puerto Rico's
high growth of the 1950s and 1960s employment lagged, and the
safety valve of emigration to the mainland was necessary."' s This
approach results in growth without development, a "gap between
gross domestic product and gross national product-that is, a grow-
ing proportion of production in Puerto Rico is not available to com-
monwealth residents because profits and interests are remitted to the
mainland."13 2 In the long run, such a program increases dependence
instead of self-sufficiency. Dependence takes the form of" 'enclave'
industries, which import most or all of their raw materials and export
their entire products."33
To avoid the "Puerto Rico model," several of the more devel-
oped countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean have established
policies such as investment-sharing or local ownership require-
ments,3 4 and limitations on access of domestic credit.35
B. Caricom in 1985
After thirteen years in existence, Caricom's continued existence
is a great achievement, but the results thus far are difficult to assess
and telling of the work remaining before the community achieves its
stated goals.
Intra-regional trade remains poor and it is not clear whether it is
improving. In 1983 trade within Caricom fell 13.3% to $481 million
from the previous year's level of $555 million, partially resulting
from a chain reaction of protectionism that started with Jamaica, fol-
lowed by Trinidad and Tobago, and later by Barbados.36 The abso-
lute level of internal Caricom trade constitutes only 8% of total trade
and is overshadowed by that with Europe, the United States, and
Canada.37 This indicates that the developmental strategy objective
of internal regional trade has not yet been met.
Local producers, furthermore, are under the constant pressure
31 Weintraub, supra note 30, at 132.
32 1L
33 Hearings, supra note 23, at 197 (statement of Robert A. Pastor); see Pastor, Sinking,
supra note 30, at 1051.
34 See Cherol & Zalduendo, Legal Framework for Foreign Investment in the Caribbean and
Central America, 18 INT'L LAw., 957, 964 (1984), translated and reprinted in El marco legal de la
inversidn extranjera en el Caribe y Centroamerica, 97 INTEGRAcI6N LATINOAMERICANA 32 (1984),
covering Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.
35 lIt at 979.
36 [The drop] was the result of economic difficulties in individual member
countries which had prompted them to take measures which set a chain reac-
tion among the others. The introduction of import restrictions by Trinidad
and Tobago was itself a response to Jamaica's multiple exchange rate system
which discriminated against Caricom trade and to the measures adopted by
Barbados to protect itself from the consequences of the Jamaican measure.
1984 O EcoN. REV. W. INDIES, BELIZE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GUYANA, Sept. 12, 1984, at 12.
37 Mann, Una evaluacidn, supra note 5, at 23.
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of competing with foreign enterprises. Promoting the internal mar-
ket only achieves the end sought if the producers are regional or
mostly regional. "Empirical evidence suggests that small manufac-
turers are forced to protect themselves in their local markets through
quantitative restrictions, thus being unable to expand their market-
ing within Caricom given the enormous commercial prowess of their
competitors." 38
Even in its weakened state, however, "Caricom trade is funda-
mental to the welfare of the regional economy."3 9 As we will see be-
low, whenever a serious threat has arisen, members unanimously
have upheld the validity of the: organization and the desire and com-
mittal to keep the Community working. 40
The interplay between local policies and regional goals is sub-
ject to the realities of politics. When the former supersedes the rele-
vance of the latter the regional scheme unavoidably tends toward
fragmentation. In July 1984 heads of all Caricom member countries
met in Bahamas and highlighted the main problems regarding the
trend to fragmentalism: Jamaica devalued its currency in order to
increase exports and increase the costs of imports; Trinidad and To-
bago, the other major manufacturer in the region, responded by also
taking steps to reduce imports. 41 These measures were understood
to be the main causes of a decline in intra-regional trade.
On another level, political needs have forced member nations to
decide whether support for a member country should be
subordinated to needs of the regional organization. In the case of
Guyana, which has had a long border dispute with Venezuela, a ma-
jor contributor to the region, Caricom has taken a neutral position,
offending member and patron alike.42
Undoubtedly, any such regional organization will have such con-
flicts, and an essential issue remains how far governments can deal
with the pressure of national demands and still conform their poli-
cies to the regional demands. "To the degree that governments
must heed the national demands for visible short-term benefits from
integration, democratic political systems are likely to pose an obsta-
cle to the integration process." 43
A regional approach, however, is still clearly favored to "going it
alone." Some have suggested that Caricom's single most outstand-
38 1d. at 29.
39 1983 Q. EcON. REv. W. INDIES, BELIzE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GUYANA, Dec. 19,
1983, at 6.
40 See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
41 Quarreling Caribbean Nations Meet, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1984, at A3, col. 2.
42 See Gonzales, The Future of CARICOM: Collective SeyReliance in Decline?, 13 CAaB-
BEAN REV. 8 (Fall 1984). The consequence of such conflicts, according to this author, is
the declining economic significance of the organization, even if the political and cultural
goals of the treaty are still considered desirable.
43 W.A. AxLiNE, supra note 8, at 202.
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ing achievement has been its capacity to survive and remain viable.44
Heads of Caricom states concluded their July 1984 meeting with an
expression of their determination "to undertake an immediate and
urgent program aimed at visibly restoring and increasing intrare-
gional trade." 45 Caricom, with the understanding of its members,
has represented the region in trade missions and in manufacturing
fairs. 46
The expansion of Caricom membership may signal a renewed
interest in the regional organization. In 1983 Bahamas, which had
been eligible to join the Community since its inception, became a
member. In 1984 heads of state expressed their desire to open Car-
icom to other countries in the area, a first step to which was "grant-
ing observer status to three non English-speaking countries: Haiti,
the Dominican Republic and Suriname." 47 More concrete steps to-
ward making the Dominican Republic a full member took place later
in 1984, and part of the express goals of such a move was to establish
common strategies to improve the region's position with the United
States. 48
Thus, Caricom remains a desired, yet still incomplete arrange-
ment to join resources for the improvement of the region by reaping
the benefits of concerted activity. Problems such as lack of basic in-
frastructure, limitations inherent to the small size of the countries,
and internal disparities between member states remain as obstacles,
though the organization's prolonged existence and recent expansion
signal the willingness of members of the region to uphold the princi-
ples the institution represents.
44 "Its flexible and permeable structure, capable of absorbing the shocks which are
sources of major disruption or complete breakdown in similar integration movements
among developing countries, seemed more appropriate to the circumstances of the late
seventies and early eighties." Gonzales, supra note 42, at 9.
45 Goals Are Set for Caribbean, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1984, at D10, col. 4. "One concrete
measure to support intra-community trade was a decision to raise Caricom's common ex-
ternal tariff (CET) by 15 percent on 14 categories of goods from January 1, 1985." 1984Q, EcON. REv. W. INDIES, BELIZE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GUYANA, Sept. 12, 1984, at 12. The
other major issue in the Conference was public debt. Heads of state requested the IMF to
extend the period of adjustment under the Extended Fund Facility and requested the
World Bank to make more funds available to allow developing countries "to support their
relevant financial institutions to enable increased trade credits to be extended and to in-
crease the resources of multilateral institutions such as the Caribbean Development Bank
(CDB) and the CMCF [Caribbean Multilateral Clearing Facility]." Id. at 13.
46 Wagenheim, Caricom Organizes Promotionsfor Manufacturers, Caribbean Bus., Jan. 30,
1985, at 10, col. 1 (Caribbean Basin ed.).
47 Caribbean Group Eases Feuds at Talks, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1984, at LI0, col. 4. At-
tracting other countries into Caricom was considered the most important long-term devel-
opment agenda in the meeting, because it meant the "tacit acceptance by members of the
need to extend the community's membership and include the much larger economy of the
Dominican Republic if it is to become a viable economic entity. Whether the inclusion of
Haiti will contribute much, either politically or economically, is rather more dubious."
1984 Q. ECON. REV. W. INDIES, BELIZE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GUYANA, Sept. 12, 1984, at 13.
48 See Editorial, Caribbean Bus., Oct. 31, 1984, at 5, col. I (Caribbean Basin ed.).
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m. The Caribbean Basin Initiative
In 1982 President Reagan announced a program to revitalize the
economy of the Caribbean "Basin," an area which includes the Car-
ibbean and Central America. The plan focused on economic growth,
although military aid to some countries also was included. Shortly
thereafter, Caricom heads of state expressed their acceptance of the
CBI plan, "but . . . they also expressed the hope that it wouldn't
undermine regional integration. " 49 The plan, passed after a year of
congressional debates, featured duty-free access to the United States
market for various goods. In the words of a special congressional
committee:
By providing the Caribbean special access to the U.S. market under
a concessionary trade regime, we will add a new dimension to the
investment analyst's view of the Caribbean as a target for new ven-
ture capital. New capital will soon generate new export income in
non-traditional as well as traditional export products.
50
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 5' is structured to
allow duty-free access to "eligible countries:"152 countries meeting
specific economic, ideologic, and policy criteria, 53 or other countries
designated by the President.
Critics quickly pointed out that the program's approach ignored
the differences between the various geographic regions of the "Ba-
sin," as defined in the Act. Central America, which has a fairly well-
developed economic infrastructure (relative to other parts of the re-
gion), is politically unstable; the Caribbean islands, on the other
hand, are fairly stable politically, but lack very basic infrastructure. 54
49 Pastor, Sinking, supra note 30, at 1052.
50 STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 98TH CONG., lsr SEss., REPORT ON
COMM. DELEGATION Visrr To THE CARIBBEAN BASIN 7 (Comm. Print 1984) (hereinafter
cited as REPORT ON CBI].
51 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Star. 384 (1983)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701w2706 (Supp. I 1983)).
52 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (Supp. I 1983).
5s Section 2702(b) includes as "beneficiary countries" those chosen from the follow-
ing group: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suri-
name, Trinidad and Tobago, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherland Antilles, Saint
Christopher-Nevis, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Virgin Islands (British). Criteria for
designation include not being Communist (19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1983)), not
having nationalized property without compensation (id. § 2702(b)(2)(A)), having always
followed arbitration in good faith (id § 2702(b)(3)), not giving preferential treatment to
another country such that U.S. commerce is adversely affected (/i § 2702(b)(4)), and other
provisions related to drug control, copyright protection, extradition of citizens, and other
criteria. Furthermore, countries must be in agreement with the GATT provisions (id
§ 2702(c)(4)), assure equitable access to the markets and basic commodity resources (id
§ 2702(c)(3)), and enforce trade policies that contribute to the revitalization of the region
and other policies that result in self Help (id § 2702(c)(6)-(7)).
54 Hearings. supra note 23, at 144 (statement of Prof. Joseph Pelzman).
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Another criticism focused on the effect of the free trade approach of
the program:
Combined with the bilateral investment treaties and increased
insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the
Administration is trying to reduce the political risk and increase the
economic incentive to U.S. business to invest in the region. The
investment program, however, might create as many problems if it
succeeds as if it fails. Almost all of the nations are quite small.
Large or numerous foreign investments could translate into dispro-
portionate economic and political power, which in turn could lead to
strident nationalistic reactions several years down the road.
55
Another general problem concerns the difficulties posed by the
objectives Of the Initiative: countries must both strive for develop-
ment in accordance with the Act and agree with other U.S. policies in
the region. One of the dangers inherent in the policy is illustrated by
the invasion of Grenada, over which Caricom nations were divided in
their support of the U.S. action. Shortly after the invasion, the
United States punished Trinidad and Tobago, the most outspoken
critic of the action, by cancelling several trade agreements. Within
months Trinidad struck the same deal with Cuba. This affected the
program's goals in two ways: it fostered trade with Cuba, which is
against the interest of the United States in the Administration's view,
and it limited trade in the region. Trinidad and Tobago is one of the
main manufacturing centers in the region, and difficulties suffered by
it affect smaller nations as well. 56
The limited impact of an approach based on tariff reductions
was recognized as soon as the Act was articulated, for tariffs were not
a major hindrance to trade between the Caribbean and the United
States. 57 An alternative argument proposed that the attention given
to the area as a result of the plan would highlight other benefits to
potential investors, such as low wages. 58 Recent developments indi-
cate that this also did not make the program effective, for without an
investment incentive, such as preferred tax treatment, the region's
manufacturing capacity is substantially in the same condition as it
55 Pastor, Sinking, supra note 30, at 1047.
56 See 1984 Q EcoN. REv. W. INDIES, BELIZE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GUYANA, Mar. 14,
1984, at 9.
57 Hearings, supra note 23, at 151 (statement of Prof. Joseph Pelzman).
58 Caribbean Initiative Attracts Investment, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1984, at D1, col. 2 [here-
inafter cited as Caribbean Initiative].
If you're thinking about a big turnaround, this will not solve the problem,
especially since a lot of the products already come duty free, [Rep. ThomasJ.
Downey] said, referring to the Generalized System of Preferences, an older
program in which 2,900 products from developing countries in all regions of
the world may enter the United States duty-free. But what the new program
does do, Mr. Downey said, "is focus attention on places with low wage rates,
such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and if they get more manufactur-
ing, that's good."
IL at D5, col. 1.
[VOL. I11
CARIBBEAN BASIN INrIIATvE
was before the Initiative.59
Development programs commonly combine aid, investment in-
centives, and trade measures. The CBI focused on opening free
trade, a rather futile measure, because most of the products were
already covered by other programs:
As the president noted, however, 87 per cent of the region's exports
already enter the United States duty-free, either through the Gener-
alized System of Preferences or because the exports do not compete
with U.S. products. Of the remaining 13 per cent, nearly one-half
are textiles and sugar, products excluded from the Free Trade Area,
leaving about 7 per cent of the region's current trade affected by the
removal of the tariffs.60
In sum, although reports on the early results of the plan indi-
cated an increase in new investment projects,6 1 by the second quar-
ter of 1984, it was apparent that the high expectations held for the
plan "had quickly evaporated."6 2
CBI is both a regional program and a group of bilateral agree-
ments. Unlike other trade programs the United States has under-
taken, the CBI is a regional plan: "IT]he measure reflects a
departure from the policy of non-discrimination-where the same
rules of trade and investment apply to all countries-to one of re-
gionalism, where a group of countries are given preferential treat-
ment." s63 The plan is implemented as a series of bilateral
agreements executed between each individual country and the
United States, which enters into each agreement upon a showing by
the country that it fulfills the criteria established in the Act. The Act
does not consider regional organizations (such as Caricom) to be
59 One reason for the doubts cast on the early promises of the CBI is that it
was originally intended that duty free access should be accompanied by a
provision extending the 10 per cent tax credits to US companies investing in
the region. This provision, which fell by the wayside on the CBI's passage
through Congress, would have encouraged US manufacturing companies to
set up in the region and import the goods produced by those subsidiaries.
Without this investment in new manufacturing capacity, the countries of the
region do not have the means of producing the goods for the US market.
O, ECON. REV. W. INDIES, BELIZE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GUYANA, June 6, 1984, at 10. One
result of this shortcoming is that Caribbean countries have been looking for investments in
other areas, such as Hong Kong. Id
60 See Caribbean Initiative, supra note 58, at D l, col. 1.
61 "If the intended beneficiaries of President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) had high hopes of the plan, these have quickly evaporated. Claims that duty free
access to the US market would increase the region's exports thereby by 50 per cent in
three years have soon proved empty." 1984 Q. EcoN. REV. W. INDIES, BELIZE, BAHAMAS,
BERMUDA, GUYANA, June 6, 1984, at 10. Reasons for the "failure" are the few products
that were not already covered by the GSP, the 255 value added requirement to qualify for
duty free treatment, and the mistrust generated by the EPA's decision to ban products
fumigated by ethylene dibromide after many countries had invested in crops using that
product. 1d
62 Feinberg & Newfarmer, A Bilateral Gamble, 47 FOREIGN POL. 133, 137 (1982). See
also Clasen, The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and Its Implications for Foreign Private
Investment, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 715, 716 (1984).
63 Clasen, supra note 62, at 745.
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parties, though these organizations have longstanding commitments
to the same goals of economic improvement and development.64 It
is anomalous that this omission was allowed.
The formal requirements of the CBERA, establishing conditions
for designated countries, discourage international organizations
from being integral parties. Though nothing in the Act's language
prevents a group of countries from seeking the special treatment as a
group, each country would be treated individually anyway and form-
ing such a group would only impose an additional requirement to
participation in the Act's benefits. Furthermore, concerted action is
discouraged because the free trade, open door policy of the Act al-
most inevitably pits each country against the others.
The distinction between a multilateral and a bilateral approach
has very serious potential implications. Commentators have noted:
"A genuinely multinational framework would allow for a more effi-
cent coordination for scarce resources as well as encourage donor
countries to share the aid burden more widely. Moreover, multi-
lateralism provides mechanisms for the transfer of aid resources
without the political tensions and resentments that accompany bilat-
eral programs."'65 Multilateralism here is used in two senses: CBI is
a one-party approach by the United States selected over an approach
that would have included Canada, Venezuela, and other regional
U.S. allies. 66 Multilateralism in the other sense refers to concertedly
coordinating U.S. policy with the efforts of the region's organizations
to adopt a common policy plan. This second usage of multilateral-
ism is of great concern and speaks directly to the relationship be-
tween Caricom and the CBI.
Consensus among the parties establishing an economic recovery
plan requires a policy that reflects the concerns of all those affected.
This is especially relevant when institutions seeking to establish a de-
velopmental strategy based on the agreement of all the parties in-
volved already exist. 67
Caricom's efforts to minimize the internal disparities of the re-
64 Mann, La Iniciativa, supra note 21, at 35.
65 Feinberg & Newfarmer, supra note 62, at 136.
66 In aJuly, 1981 meeting in Nassau, the foreign ministers from the United
States, Canada, Venezuela and Mexico met to discuss proposals for the re-
gion. In the months that followed, however, the "Nassau Four" began to
differ in their conceptions of the plan. Mexico refused to attend a meeting in
Santo Domingo with representatives for the participating countries because
Cuba had not been included as a participant. By the end of that year, it had
become clear that there would be little cooperation among the Nassau Four.
This was largely due to Mexican and Canadian complaints that the U.S. initi-
ative had failed to include any serious consultation with the governments of
the region and was being used as an ideological tool directed against particu-
lar countries.
Clasen, supra note 62, at 718-19.
67 See Pastor, Sinking, supra note 30, at 1057.
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gion through the concerted effort of more developed and less devel-
oped countries can and have been seriously undermined by the
CBI's unilateral approach, which will foster development in those
countries already on the development curve, and will accentuate the
weak economies and infrastructures of the other countries.68 Fur-
thermore, the overwhelming disparity between the U.S. economy
and the Caribbean economies provides little basis to believe that the
agreements will reflect common interests in both parts of each
agreement.69
Insofar as the CBI seeks stability and well-being in the Carib-
bean, it does not conflict with the goals of Caricom. Indeed, the CBI
requires a showing that the countries' trade policies contribute to the
revitalization of the region. 70 In requesting inclusion as a beneficiary
country, Jamaica stated that "[o]f particular importance is the objec-
tive of fostering economic integration with the Caribbean Commu-
nity and Common Market while also seeking to expand intra-
regional trade within the Caribbean Basin with a view to revitaliza-
tion of the region."' 7' Whether these CBI goals are consistent with
the methodology of the Initiative is questionable.
In formulating the role of the private sector, "[t]he Reagan ad-
ministration has mistakenly emphasized the private sector as the sin-
gle key to development. Its role can be crucial, but private investors
are unlikely to deal with critical infrastructure problems that severely
hamper Caribbean development." '7 2 Although it is highly debatable
whether assistance directed to the public sector should be the focus
68 See Wagenheim, U.S. Secretary of State Exhorts Private Investors, Caribbean Bus., Dec.
12, 1984, at 2, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Secretary Exhorts] (Barbados, Belize, Grenada, and
Jamaica experience "spectacular growth" in the amount of exports to the United States.
Based on the levels of development of the countries involved, growth in the Jamaican
economy, which already has an extant exchange with the United States, means something
enormously different than the impact on Grenada).
69 The CBI reflects the administration's interest in military security, political
loyalty, and advantages for United States firms, rather than United States
concern for the region's long-term development. Because most Caribbean
countries are dependent on the United States, they will speak the language
the administration wants to hear, but they are disenchanted by Washington's
emphasis and rhetoric.
Lowenthal, Misplaced Emphasis, 47 FOREIGN POL. 114, 115 (1982).
70 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(3) (Supp. I 1983).
71 Report on CBI, supra note 50, at 29 (letter of H.L. Shearer, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jamaica, to William Brock, U.S. Ambassador and Special
Trade Rep.). See also id at 37, 53.
72 Lowenthal, supra note 69, at 116. But see Clasen, supra note 62, at 746-47.
This willingness of the United States to involve itself in the Caribbean, even
militarily, goes to the heart of what the business community has viewed as the
fundamental obstacle to relocation or expansion in the region: the Carib-
bean's political instability .... The overall commitment evidenced by the
CBI is unquestionably of much greater significance than any particular provi-
sion of the Act.
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of a development program,75 a program based solely or substantially
on the private sector will be advantageous only where the basic infra-
structure, both physical and human, is available. The result of a plan
geared only toward the workings of the private sector will almost un-
avoidably result in enhancing levels of disparity between more devel-
oped and less developed countries.
CBI beneficiary countries are chosen from the list of eligible
countries provided in the Act according to criteria mentioned above.
The President can decide to exclude participation for "subjective
reasons not intended to be considered."'74 The President has enor-
mous discretion, which may lead to a feeling of insecurity by poten-
tial investors and affected countries alike. The bilateral approach is
further cast in shadow by the executive's power: "[n]othing in the
Act would prevent these [trade] delegations from negotiating with
the countries to obtain economic concessions designed to foster U.S.
trade and investment at the expense of the local economy." 75 Fur-
ther heightening insecurity, the President has the power to terminate
participation upon sixty days' notice.
IV. Results and Interplay
To Caribbean integration and to Caricom, the main manifesta-
tion of that yet unrealized goal, the CBI may be harmful and even
annihilating. Both international instruments collide in their means,
even if the overall goals are theoretically in harmony. The possible
effect of accentuating the region's disintegrating factors is even more
worrisome in the long run, for the failure of the smaller countries to
grow at a pace with the larger ones will create pressures in the region
counterproductive to the CBI goals. Among other consequences of
further accentuated disparity, population and resources may flow
from the less developed to the more developed countries.
Recent events suggest that focus on the private sector alone
presents serious obstacles to the goals sought, despite very high ex-
pectations fomented by the initiation of the program. The incom-
plete success of the CBI has been noted by Secretary of State George
Schultz: "[t]he private sector ... is the crucial link .... as we are all
uncomfortably aware, private resources, domestic or foreign, have
73 The emphasis of the Administration's aid program is to assist the private
sector. Most foreign aid programs are unintentionally biased toward the
public sector since the private sector is weak or nonexistent in most develop-
ing countries and only the governments can meet the nation's development
needs. In small countries, the public sector grows so much faster than the
private sector that public financing becomes tenuous, and governments have
to rely increasingly on external support even for routine services.
Pastor, Sinking, supra note 30, at 104849.
74 Clasen, supm note 62, at 726.
75 Id. at 727.
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not been sufficiently forthcoming. This is the heart of the matter."176
Even a recent increase in trade between CBI countries and the
United States might continue to indicate failure, for the increase was
low in proportion to the expansion of the U.S. economy.7
Events in 1985 are indicative of the interplay between the re-
gional apparatus and the new plan: private investment has not sig-
nificantly grown and progress has been concentrated in the more
developed countries, creating resentment among the less developed
countries.7 8
V. Conclusion
The interplay between these two international arrangements,
one a regional organization, the other a plan that grants special
treatment to segments of a region, seems to result in a defeat of the
goals common to both instruments. Caricom seeks to gather re-
sources to level out the differences in infrastructure that otherwise
will cause the smaller countries to remain stagnant; the CBI, in ig-
noring infrastructure needs, disrupts harmony by accentuating the
differences already present. The economics of scale sought by Car-
icom in the coordination of policies to achieve a regional production
unit is defeated by CBI's absolute reliance on the private sector,
which seldom gathers the foresight, resources, or interest to ap-
proach investment and production on a regional, long-term basis.
Caricom seeks to minimize the disparities between its member coun-
tries by granting special treatment to less developed member coun-
tries, and by placing a special burden on the more developed
countries. The CBI, on the other hand, again by relying solely on
the private sector, will continue accentuating the existing disparities
by concentrating investment in the countries that already have the
means to start production.
76 Secretary Exhorts, supra note 68, at 2, col. 1.
77 The U.S. Department of Commerce announced in May 1984 that compared to the
prior year, imports from CBI beneficiaries between January and May had grown 17.6%, to
$3.5 billion.
It would be wrong, however, to attribute this increase solely to the CBI as the
strong performance of the US economy and the strong dollar have combined
to suck in imported goods.... Exporters in the region share the view that
the increased shipments to the USA would have come about without the CBI,
citing the example of fruit, food and electronic components. The CBI has
added only marginally to the categories of Caribbean exports given privi.
leged access to the USA, and excludes items such as textiles and clothing,
footwear and leather goods, which constitute the backbone of the region's
light industry. In those areas where there is scope for significant increases in
shipments, the countries of the region lack the industrial infrastructure nec-
essary to take advantage of the opportunities.
1984 Q ECON. REv. W. INDIES, BELIZE, BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, GuYANA, Dec. 4, 1984, at 13-
14.
78 Some Hard GoingAhead, Caribbean Bus.,Jan. 30, 1985, at 6, col. I (Caribbean Basin
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Whether it is possible for Caricom to be a party to any multilat-
eral agreement depends on whether it is an entity with the power to
negotiate or sign treaties. One of the main objectives of the Caricom
Treaty is to create a common front before the external world.79 The
"primary responsibility" [of the Conference, the main executive
body,] is to "determine the policy of the Community,"8 and "sub-
ject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Conference shall be
the final authority for the conclusion of treaties on behalf of the
Community and International Organizations and States." 8' A Com-
mittee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs is created to help member
states coordinate their foreign policies as much as possible.8 2 Car-
icom can and was intended to be the representative of the region in
precisely the issues addressed by the CBI. Caricom, like the Com-
mon Market, has the power to enter into treaties, 83 and member
states have agreed to accord their policies with those of Caricom, so
an agreement with Caricom could have a regional impact far beyond
that attainable through individual negotiations and agreements.
As for the CBERA, the mode of choosing and designating bene-
ficiary countries would have to be amended to enable an entity such
as Caricom to be a party to the Act. As long as the substantive re-
quirements are retained, nothing in the stated policies prevents this
approach. In fact, such an approach would enhance the policy of
demanding from each country a commitment to the revitalization of
the region. Whether, in reality, such a change could ever be enacted
is indeterminate, but in the opinion of the authors any integrated
approach using both of these powerful legal instruments is prefera-
ble to the present situation.
79 Caricom Treaty, supra note 3, preamble.
80 l art. 8(1).
81 l art. 8(4).
82 1d art. 17(1).
83 Id. arts. 20(l), 20(3); Annex, supra note 9, art. 63.
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